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Everywhere and all the time: accident, radical contingency, and Crash 
What are the politics of the accident? This essay interrogates the accident trope’s 
dual meaning in critical theory and popular narrative as both historically endemic 
and conditional for a political theory of radical resistance and ethical relation. I 
explore this in Paul Haggis’ 2004 film Crash, a popular narrative that plots the 
accident to provide an opening for a politics of possibility and ethical engagement. 
However, this essay critiques efforts to situate accidents, and therefore 
contingency, as both historically endemic and politically resistant, arguing for the 
difficulty of reading a specific theory of political and ethical decision into 
something ontologically given. Crash stretches contingency to incorporate 
temporality itself, and in doing so nullifies consideration of institutional histories of 
race and class, which aesthetically foregrounds and troubles related assumptions 
made by a critical mode that too quickly reads a specific politics and ethics 
into contingency's deviation from necessary law. The essay re-evaluates the 
accident's political and ethical coordinates through reference to Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe’s theorisation of contingency as conditional for political meaning 
more generally. Accidents, it concludes, are politically and ethically mobile, if they, 
as Crash and theories of radical contingency contend, happen everywhere and all 
the time. 
Keywords: accident, radical contingency, popular aesthetics, Crash, Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe 
Introduction 
What are the politics of the accident? To approach this question, we need to consider the 
role contingency plays in a theory of political and ethical decision. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the 2004 Hollywood film Crash asks this question in as direct a way as any recent 
plotting of the accident, exploring in popular form issues of the accident’s political 
productivity that have also occupied recent debates in critical theory. Crash represents the 
accident to be at once historically endemic, a product of unequal stratifications of risk, 
and an event primed to reflect contingency’s constitutive relation to time and the open 
future. Crash’s version of the car crash narrative, which builds on a rich literary and 
cinematic history, draws on these different contexts in order to subsequently represent the 
accident as a politically productive event, invoking contingency to be a resistant and 
ethically demanding force. 
The film questions the accident’s politics and ethics in its first scene, in which two 
police detectives, who have just been in a car accident, discuss their crash:  
 GRAHAM:  It’s the sense of touch. 
 RIA:   … what? 
 GRAHAM:  In any real city, you walk, you know? You brush past people, 
people bump into you. In L.A., nobody touches you. We’re always behind this 
metal and glass. I think we miss that touch so much, that we crash into each 
other, just so we can feel something. 
  […] 
 RIA:   Graham, I think we got rear-ended, I think we spun around 
twice, and somewhere in there, one of us lost our frame of reference.1 
Both Graham (Don Cheadle) and Ria (Jennifer Esposito) judge the significance of the 
accident differently. For Ria, accidents are simply things that happen, meaningless chance 
events that are epiphenomenal to contemporary life. In a statement that has partly defined 
the film’s reception, however, Graham suggests that accidents are instead productive 
events, and catalysts for affective encounters in a socially alienated Los Angeles that 
engineer unexpected ethical relations between oneself and another. Missing a sense of 
‘touch’, accident victims strangely desire accidental contact in order to feel something. 
Graham’s interpretation of this motive comes belatedly, after the accident, and the film 
considers a possible unconscious will toward accident less through a representation of 
deliberately willed vehicular crashes than through a narrative in which accidental 
encounters create often positive and redeeming outcomes for its plethora of characters. 
People, according to Graham, will an exposure to the chance of this connection, which, 
paradoxically, comes about through the agency of unwillable and unexpected events. 
‘Touch’ therefore depends on the contingency of an accident to circumvent the city’s 
anticipatory shielding of connection. To question the politics of the accident, Ria’s and 
Graham’s conversation suggests, one must consider contingency’s historical, political, 
and modal contexts. 
This essay argues that through the film’s combination of these different contexts, 
Crash represents the trope of the accident to provide an opening for ethical interaction 
and political possibility for characters and viewer alike. In doing so, the film presents an 
ethical and political stance toward the accident that follows a pattern of politicising 
contingency, albeit in an aesthetic and representational sense, that is also discernible in 
theoretical discourses concerned with the idea of a radical contingency. But more 
importantly, this essay argues that in doing so Crash makes legible in narrative form the 
limitations of this kind of account of politicised and ethicised contingency that, I suggest, 
afflict its various manifestations, from recent valuations of the contingent event in critical 
theory to Crash’s representational politics. Crash’s much-maligned Hollywood 
liberalism, its reduction of race and class to a series of personal grievances, and its over-
reliance on acts of personal heroism are not all the direct result of the film’s attempt to 
politicise and ethicise the accident.2 But the narrative’s centrifugal employment of the 
accident within this milieu presents a limit case of what discourses of radical contingency 
can be made to do in popular aesthetic form. By reducing political decision and ethical 
demand to a vague embrace of accidental encounters, which repeatedly nullifies structural 
critique, Crash’s narrative emptily concludes by evacuating the accident of any criteria 
for judging ethical interaction or political decision, instead making the trope synonymous 
with time. In doing so, the film’s representation of the accident points towards limitations 
in the account of contingency it appears to share with theoretical discourses that seek a 
politically and ethically radical contingency.  
Contingency as I describe it in this essay is a modal category of possibility, which 
is constitutive of the future’s natural opacity, history’s contingent rather than necessary 
ground, and events’ inevitable deviations from natural law. In other words, contingency 
suggests that when an event happens, it could have happened differently, or not at all. 
Because of this, contingency is often associated with models of causality that are random, 
complex, and ambiguous, and for this reason accidents offer a privileged representation of 
this modality.3 The notion of ‘radical’ contingency therefore takes a number of related 
forms in this account. In its first meaning, radical contingency describes contingency to 
be an existential structure or unsurpassable horizon for objectivity and meaning. In its 
second meaning, radical contingency theorises contingency to be a politically radical form 
that, when embraced, prescribes specific political and ethical outcomes. My critique 
concerns the translation from this first meaning into the second, the latter of which I argue 
flattens social and historical context in its effort to make contingency guarantee a radical 
politics and ethics.  
Crash offers an aesthetic vantage point through which to consider how these two 
forms of ‘radical’ contingency entwine, and provides an opportunity to analyse a 
theoretical discourse that conceptualises the accident, and therefore contingency, as a site 
of political and ethical possibility. Through analysis of the film’s exploration of urban 
alienation, its view of racism in contemporary Los Angeles through the lens of 
individualised prejudice, and its trivialisation of contingency’s social distribution in 
favour of a focus on vivid accidental encounters, I argue that accidents can be neither 
resistant nor good in themselves. When Crash and theoretical discourses employ a similar 
conceptualisation of contingency, treating it as a modality that is broadly constitutive of 
time, for the purposes of opening up or transforming subject positions, they reduce social 
and historical relations to a meaningless void that nullifies structural critique. To analyse 
this shared ambivalence in film and theory, I turn to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s 
work on contingency’s constitutive relation to politics. Laclau and Mouffe’s 
poststructuralist political philosophy instead positions contingency to be a ground for any 
and every political and ethical decision. Contingency does not, in and of itself, prescribe a 
specific ethics or politics. Through analysis of Crash, then, this essay seeks to gain 
purchase on a criticism surrounding contingency that too readily reads political resistance 
and ethical demand into an existential structure that is as ubiquitous as time. 
 
Plotting the accident 
Accidents are unforeseeable events that are often conceived of as escaping direct 
responsibility and clear causality.4 They fit into the broader subset of chance events. 
Chance, in turn, resides in the category of contingency, a term designating the existential 
possibility of things happening that do not necessarily have to happen. Contingency 
therefore contrasts with the principle of necessity, the latter of which refigures the 
semblance of chance into the impression that it was always going to happen. 
Contingency’s predominant expression in the philosophy of modality affirms the future’s 
natural opacity and insists on the possibility for an event’s unexpected divergence from 
illusory law. 
The accident’s complex causality and unexpected occurrence offers a tangible 
instance of contingency’s often-inexpressible conceptualisation of time. But nevertheless, 
because accidental events refer to a specific event or occurrence, their demarcation is 
always subject to interpretation. What I see as an accident, another may not. An 
accident’s denomination, in other words, reveals a time’s and place’s causal 
epistemology.5  
This leads philosopher of speed Paul Virilio to argue that the accident provides a 
key hermeneutic tool for describing late capitalist modernity’s systematic production of 
risk. In doing so, Virilio formulates an historical account of the accident that describes life 
in technological capitalism to be perpetually subjected to contingent events that are, from 
a broader perspective, the necessary ‘blowback’ of that same system. Describing this 
contradictory modality through the logic of inevitable accidents, Virilio argues that 
modernity invents its own catastrophes: 
To invent the sailing ship or steamer is to invent the shipwreck. To invent the train is 
to invent the rail accident of derailment. To invent the family automobile is to 
produce the pile-up on the highway.6   
While still ostensibly contingent on the surface of their appearance, accidents are also the 
necessary outcome of late capitalist production. They are ‘an invention in the sense of 
uncovering what was hidden, just waiting to happen’.7 Virilio historicises the accident to 
depict modernity as increasingly uncertain and subject to accident. His eschatological 
sociology underwrites the event’s contingency with a systemic view of their statistical 
regularity and technological necessity.8 This interrelated production of uncertainty, risk, 
and accident is, as critics of race and poverty point out, often unevenly distributed.9 No 
longer the spanner in the works of a conveyer-smooth Fordism, the accident is rather an 
inevitable, socially distributed outcome of late capitalist modernity. 
Virilio’s story of the rise of telecommunications and transport infrastructures 
presents a familiar representation of modernity as a spatially compressed, temporally 
accelerated era of collisions between the self and technology. The rich narrative history of 
the speeding automobile and car crash, to which Crash adds, in part signifies this 
representation’s associated cultural anxieties.10 The history of cinema also holds a unique 
relation to this representation, being a medium that is often theorised as preoccupied with 
the accident’s representation and rationalisation. The car accident then, from early 
documentary film through to the Hollywood ‘network’ genre of the early 2000s, provides 
one aesthetic imaginary for the anxieties surrounding late modernity’s production of risk 
and emphasises cinema’s theorisation as a medium technologically conditioned on 
recording and archiving the accidental.11 
Of the car accident’s cinematic and literary heritage, Crash notably shares its title 
with J. G. Ballard’s 1973 novel Crash and David Cronenberg’s 1996 film adaptation. 
Both Ballard’s novel and Cronenberg’s film provide well-known evocations of 
technological modernity’s systemic production of the car accident. Yet unlike in Haggis’ 
Crash, which, as I will suggest, values the car accident for its affective interruption of 
social alienation, both Ballard’s Crash and Cronenberg’s Crash depict accidents to have 
been anticipated, prepared for, and mediated by consumer society. Ballard’s Crash in 
particular points to the mass media’s interpellation of protagonist James Ballard into 
sexual fantasies of vehicular crashes. His fantasies of the accident and his paranoia over 
their mediation by television advertising worries away at the contingency of the novel’s 
many accidents. James’ world is overwhelmed by ‘road safety propaganda’, from 
television enactments of accidents to the ‘Road Research Laboratory’, an institution 
dedicated to the simulation of the car crash.12 Cronenberg’s adaptation re-locates the 
novel’s obsessions from Surrey to an unnamed North American city, but continues to 
follow the story of James and his cohort of car crash addicts who, to quote ringleader 
Vaughan in the film, desire the ‘fertilising rather than […] destructive event’ of the car 
accident.13 Like the novel, Cronenberg’s adaptation is replete in deliberately willed car 
crashes and a shared interest in the accident’s technological mediation. This shared focus 
frequently puts strain on both the book’s and film’s representations of unmediated 
contingency: both portray characters’ desires for the vehicular crash to partially allegorise 
technological modernity’s production of the necessary and inevitable car accident.14 
Except in this case, that systemic production manifests in characters’ efforts to bring 
about their own crashes. James Ballard’s anxiety in the novel in particular figures the 
accident’s inevitable production through a paranoia over its pre-meditation; it is as if 
society’s mass mediation of the car accident rehearses his life’s gruesome climax ‘years 
in advance, and would take place on some highway or road junction known only to the 
makers of these [road safety] films’.15 Although continuing these narratives’ reflections 
on the abundance of accidents in urban space, Haggis’ Crash treats the accident’s 
contingency very differently. This latter Crash historicises the accident but 
simultaneously transposes the trope onto a narrative of social alienation, with specific 
focus on racial and class discord. The accident’s contingency becomes essential in the 
film’s attempt to address this story of alienation in contemporary Los Angeles.  
Crash shows lives in a tense, racially divided Los Angeles repeatedly subject to 
accident. Many characters are at one point victim to either an accident or an unexpected 
encounter, and the film orchestrates these events with an unwavering fidelity to its genre, 
variously called the ‘network’, ‘ensemble’, or ‘fractal’ film.16 This genre involves a wide 
assemblage of intersecting plotlines, which often come together through chance 
encounters. It functions through the viewer’s cognisance of a character’s place in the 
film’s whole, which is often only partially glimpsed, taking the shape of what Caroline 
Levine would call a ‘network’ structure, a complex organisation of ‘connectedness’.17 
Crash’s plots link up according to this diffuse structure, unfolding through a series of 
events, encounters, and entangled relations. 
Crash formalises these intersecting storylines through non-linear narrative 
organisation. It begins with Graham and Ria’s arrival at a murder investigation, before 
cutting to Dorri (Bahar Soomekh) and her father Farhad (Shaun Toub) the day earlier 
buying a gun. After Farhad, the film cuts to Anthony (Ludacris) and Peter (Larenz Tate), 
the latter of whom we later discover to be the body visited by Graham and Ria. Graham 
and Ria, Farhad and Dorri, and Anthony and Peter thus each interconnect in both a formal 
and thematic sense; formal, insofar as they occupy the same world, and thematic, because 
of each character’s similar imbrication in an environment ubiquitously subject to accident. 
This non-linear organisation thematically insists on Crash’s main rule of plotting: small 
decisions and minute fluctuations produce large and unexpected outcomes. If not for 
Dorri mistakenly choosing blanks for Farhad’s gun, Farhad, later angry, would’ve killed, 
by further accident, Daniel’s (Michael Peña) daughter, in an attempt to shoot Daniel 
himself. Crash’s plotting of these interrelations through chance, in which a character’s 
small decisions can produce dramatically unexpected outcomes, suits the accident, an 
event structure that follows the rule of ‘minor causes, great effects’.18 This makes for a 
film that presents accidents, chance encounters, and miscommunication to model an 
historical present of networked complexity and inevitable accident.19 
The accident functions in a number of ways in this representation: a method of 
showing complex connections between characters, a reflection of modernity’s systemic 
production of risk to accident, and a narrative tool for mapping the links between 
individuals, institutions, and government as they cross over and through economic and 
racial inequalities. This does not mean that the film always maps institutional and 
individual interconnection through accident, however. In the case of police officer 
Graham’s deliberate withholding of evidence under the demand of District Attorney Rick 
Cabot (Brendan Fraser), the film traces a direct causal link from Rick’s political desire to 
appeal to ‘the black vote’ all the way to Graham’s manipulation of evidence for the sake 
of his brother’s criminal record. But directly causal relationships like this are a rare 
occurrence in the film’s representation of complex arrangements of race and class 
colliding through often unexpected and unforeseeable events.  
This is none clearer than the scene in which white police officer Tom Hanson 
(Ryan Phillipe) kills Peter, a young African-American man. The scene demonstrates the 
accident’s political ambiguity, here at odds with Graham’s idealised contingent ‘touch’, 
by layering Crash’s racial politics of individual prejudice over what it narrates to be a 
personal accident. Late in the film, Hanson offers a hitchhiking Peter a seat in his car. 
Coincidentally, it was Hanson who chased Peter’s friend Anthony earlier in the day. 
While driving, Peter laughs at Hanson because he sees that Hanson also has a ‘lucky’ 
figurine of St. Christopher on his dashboard. Peter reaches into his coat pocket to show 
him his own figurine, but Hanson suspects Peter of reaching for a weapon and so he 
shoots him. Hanson’s subsequent visual disbelief at his mistake sits uneasily with the 
clear case that he fires on Peter because of his own racial profiling. But Crash’s narrative 
works to individualise Hanson’s racism. Peter’s murder, first of all, happens when 
Hanson is off-duty. That Peter is killed by Hanson, a new police officer who earlier 
complains about his racist partner Officer Ryan (Matt Dillon), individualises 
responsibility for Peter’s murder, and echoes Ryan’s earlier warning to Hanson that ‘You 
think you know who you are … you have no idea’. By also foregrounding Peter’s and 
Hanson’s shared superstitions through the St. Christopher figurine, the scene draws on 
what critics have noted to be the film’s humanistic response to race and shared personal 
prejudice, rather than focussing on the racialised power and privilege differentiating 
them.20 These details feed into an individualisation of Hanson’s actions that mutes 
potential consideration of institutional racism as cause for this event. The camera’s close-
up zoom into Hanson’s panicked face on seeing Peter’s figurine makes an admission of 
personal error. It draws the viewer into a pained identification with him. His disbelief 
impresses on this killing a sense that it was as much the result of an inexplicable mistake 
or accident on Hanson’s behalf as it was the direct cause of institutionally attributable 
racial profiling. 
The scene works to make the event appear accidental in order to partially reduce 
Peter’s murder to Hanson’s individual responsibility. I stress partially, however. After all, 
the film’s simultaneous gesture toward Hanson’s internalised prejudice means that the 
viewer will undoubtedly interpret his actions to be informed by structural and institutional 
racism even if Crash neglects to explore this with any real investment. This creates an 
interpretative difference, split between a reading of the killing as a personal accident and 
a reading of it as the outcome of structural racism, random and meaningless but 
institutionally caused and personally motivated. On the one hand, Peter’s murder 
represents a grim example of uneven risk and the accident’s social distribution, resulting 
in a young African-American man’s death at the hands of a white police officer. On the 
other, Crash’s representation of this murder as accidental also supports the film’s more 
systematic occlusion of the social histories of race and class and the institutional forms of 
racism that cause Peter’s death.21 By reducing the event to a personal and inexplicable 
mistake, Crash focusses blame on Hanson’s individual prejudice and silences structural 
causality. This may initially appear at odds with Crash’s efforts to present the contingent 
event as opening up political and ethical possibility in its story of social alienation. But 
the film’s narration of Peter’s murder as accidental points toward the accident’s broader 
role in Crash. Repeated plotted accidents underline the film’s ubiquitous presentation of 
contingency; but building on Graham’s normative desire for ‘touch’, the narrative’s 
frequent mobilisation of that subjection for the purposes of staging painful, if ultimately 
positive, accidental encounters also, like in the case of Peter’s murder, mutes social and 
historical context in favour of an individualised view of personal prejudice that the film 
represents as possible to overcome. This feeds into how Crash structures its narrative 
around the plotted accident. It represents the accident making ethical demands on 
character and viewer alike, but this representation mutes consideration of the accident’s 
uneven social distribution and the different kinds of vulnerability to contingency shaped 
by racial and class inequalities. 
 
Radical contingency 
Sanjay Sharma argues that Crash’s incapacity to properly analyse racism invites a critical 
method better suited to understanding how the film’s representation of race and power 
‘works’ rather than one that uncovers its ineffective critique.22 I follow a similar 
methodology in this account of Crash’s representation of the accident. Not in order to 
offer another critique of the film’s representation of racism, but rather to understand the 
operations through which the accident and, by extension, contingency is made politically 
emancipatory and ethically demanding. In coordination with its portrayal of contemporary 
life’s vulnerability to accident, then, Crash also figures the event as a concomitant 
response to racial and class inequality that can produce ethical social relations. This takes 
form in Graham’s normative desire for ‘touch’. Such a process, I suggest, follows, in 
popular aesthetic form, a pattern of politicising the accident discernible elsewhere in 
critical theory. 
Recent critical attention to contingency, whether discussed in terms of the 
accident, the event, or the clinamen, has put conceptual importance on the constitutively 
contingent nature of historical processes.23 Contingency in this sense is radical insofar as 
it provides an existential condition for time and being. It represents an unsurpassable, 
conceptual rule that shows necessary explanations of causality, history, and natural law to 
be retroactive fictions.24 One prominent voice for this kind of radical contingency is 
Catherine Malabou, whose theory of ‘plasticity’, a combination of neurobiological rupture 
and deconstruction, provides a materialist model for the capacity of unexpected 
occurrence in everything from the brain to the present. For Malabou, the accident 
represents the plastic nature of being and sketches out the beginnings of an ontological 
law: 
recognising the ontology of the accident is a philosophically difficult task: it must be 
acknowledged as a law that is simultaneously logical and biological, but a law that 
does not allow us to anticipate its instances. Here is a law surprised by its own 
instances.25 
The accident is a rule of unpredictable possibility. It puts primacy on the unforeseen as 
opposed to the predictable, the opaque future as opposed to the anticipated one, and the 
contradictory necessity of contingency. 
Malabou’s work is often ambivalent about the accident’s political and ethical 
qualities, moving between the event’s productive modelling of a relation of ‘recognition, 
of non-domination, and of liberty’ to its destructive and violent nature.26 Critical theorist 
Todd McGowan, however, suggests that the ‘philosophically difficult task’ of describing 
an accident implicates the event’s invitation of narration in the language of ethical 
demand, which bears upon political decision in the present. In this respect, McGowan’s 
work provides an illustrative shorthand for a kind of theorisation of radical contingency 
that stresses the concept’s politically radical nature.  
For McGowan, an accident’s or contingent event’s occurrence throws the subject 
into a dearth of possible signification as to the cause and reason of the event. What this 
dearth of signification shows, however, is the falsity of necessary explanation. This is 
because these events indicate ‘the incompleteness of every structure [that] marks the limit 
of structural necessity’.27 Accidents are thus epistemological fulcra that provide insight 
into an ontologically conditional contingency. McGowan then proceeds to align necessity 
with discourses principally opposed to a radical, emancipatory politics. The latter can 
only precipitate, he suggests, from recognising existential incompletion: 
In the space of this absence [of the real Other], one finds a contingent moment that 
takes one by surprise and remains fundamentally inexplicable. Rather than reducing 
contingency to a deeper necessity in the way of the believer (in God, in the War on 
Terror, in progress, in Nature), we might avow the contingent, believe in it as our 
unsurpassable limit, and place it at the centre of our conceptual universe. The 
politicised subject exists in a universe structured around contingency.28 
The subject’s avowal of contingency opens them to a horizon of resistant possibility and 
provides them with a kind of best ethical attitude, one that ‘offers the subject the 
opportunity to act’.29 Avowal of contingency therefore furnishes the politicised subject 
with ‘an opening through which a genuine relationship outside of clearly structured 
positions’ is possible.30 Exposure to contingency can be an anxious experience, but it also 
‘represents the only possibility for connection’ with otherness as long as we ‘avoid 
reducing the contingent event to an underlying necessity’.31 McGowan therefore stakes 
two important assertions on the contingent event’s – and the accident’s – politics. On the 
one hand, quite simply, contingency is life’s unsurpassable limit. On the other, 
contingency’s proper recognition as unsurpassable limit provides an opening for a politics 
of resistance and a model of good ethical practice if embraced. Because of the contrast 
between this attitude of recognition and a clearly conservative necessity, it is as if 
contingency guarantees a specific politics and ethical interrelation if acknowledged 
properly.32 Radical political decisions issue from an acknowledgement of this constitutive 
contingency that makes a demand on the subject, which can happen from exposure to an 
accidental event. McGowan’s argument therefore demonstrates the subtle travelling of 
contingency from an abstract principle of time (radical contingency in its first sense) to 
something that is in its essence emancipatory (radical contingency in its second sense). 
Accidents indicate the contradictory law of contingency, but contingency’s proper 
acknowledgement in turn can provide an opening for a radical politics and ethics that are 
implicit in and issue from that avowal. 
My gambit is that through an analysis of Crash, we can approach the theoretically 
problematic transition of contingency’s ontological status into contingency’s political and 
ethical essence. Despite McGowan’s description of the contingent event’s oppositional 
capacity, there remains the more tangled hermeneutical issue that concerns whether or not 
contingency’s recognition is not just conditional for a specific kind of politics, but can 
rather also ground any and every political form. That is, if accidents both manifest in 
socially differentiated ways and express time’s constitutive contingency, then why can’t 
contingency also condition other political and ethical outcomes, including conservative 
and non-ethical relations? 
Crash’s narration of a series of ethically charged encounters arguably gives critics 
of politically radical contingency what they want. But the film’s superimposition of the 
accident’s political and ethical demand onto its representation of racial and class 
inequality produces an irresolvable tension, in which incidents that evidence the 
accident’s historically and socially uneven distribution persist, albeit barely visibly, as a 
remainder of the politically productive accident. In order for radical contingency to 
cohere, in other words, Crash has to flatten the accident’s historical particularity, 
resulting in a curiously contentless representation of the trope that becomes, by the film’s 
end, synonymous with time. Crash urges character and viewer alike to be open to the 
hopeful capacities of contingent events, but by representing an equivalence between 
accidents and temporality itself, the film shows accidents to also be the opposite, a trope 
that encompasses any and every political horizon and that is not essentially politically 
radical. 
Early on, Crash strikes a series of equivalences between racism, anticipation, and 
affect in order to position the accident in a way that shifts it from an historical 
phenomenon to an event prized for its capacity to circumvent race and class formations. 
Eight minutes in, Anthony and Peter, two young African-American men, the latter of 
whom Hanson later kills, debate their stereotyping and treatment when in a restaurant. 
This early, reflexive framing of the film as predominantly occupied with race then shows 
white couple Jean Cabot (Sandra Bullock) and husband Rick walking past Anthony and 
Peter and physically recoiling from them. Anthony notices: ‘She got colder as soon as she 
saw us.’ Jean’s withdrawal projects an expectation onto Anthony. Her recoil suggests that 
Anthony and Peter can touch her even without physical contact. After all, physical recoil 
from another’s body can still imply contact, as Sara Ahmed suggests, even if invisible: ‘to 
withdraw from a relation of physical proximity to bodies recognised as strange is 
precisely to be touched by those bodies, in such a way that the subject is moved from its 
place’.33 Anthony and Peter touch Jean despite their lack of physical contact; in turn, she 
touches them by withdrawing, policing their bodies according to an anticipatory racism 
that acts non-physically.  
Jean’s recoil shows ‘touch’ functioning socially, differentiating as much as it 
ethically relates. She determines Anthony and Peter’s presence in this social space 
through expectations she projects onto them. Crash uses this scene to establish a 
structural equivalence between racism and anticipation. However, almost as if in response 
to this, Crash proceeds to unpick the kernel of Graham’s idealised ‘touch’ from Jean’s 
demonstration of touch’s racist operation through the help of the contingent encounter. 
The film’s use of accidents, and especially car accidents, is central for this representation, 
which it presents to be in some way circumventive of racism’s anticipatory measures and 
an opening for ethical recognition. 
The film stages four car accidents. The first happens off-screen, prior to Ria and 
Graham’s opening discussion. The second involves Anthony and Peter in a collision with 
Park (Daniel Dae Kim), whom they take to hospital. The third is a serious car accident 
involving Christine (Thandie Newton), an African-American woman coping with the 
trauma of her sexual assault earlier at the hands of white police officer Ryan. The film 
doubles down on its insistent plotting of chance interconnection here, however, by 
ensuring that Ryan discovers her car. A final accident in the film involves a rear-end 
collision between insurance administrator Shaniqua Johnson (Loretta Devine) and an 
unnamed character, and most forcibly synonymises the accident with time.  
Christine’s accident is an iconic instance of the film’s investment in contingently 
encountered ‘touch’. Crash narrates her accident in the cut. After cutting away from her 
argument with her husband, Cameron (Terrence Howard), to a scene in which Farhad 
considers his revenge on Daniel, the camera cuts back to her overturned car, focalised 
through Ryan’s perspective. Christine’s accident happens in the time of this cut, forcing 
the viewer to reconstruct it.34 Ryan rushes over to the car to find a concussed Christine. 
The film’s discursive indifference to the actual accidental event, replaced by its attention 
to the accident’s re-introduction of Ryan and Christine, emphasises their purposeful 
convergence. Because of his earlier sexual assault, Christine reacts with horror. She 
refuses rescue, but he urges her to let him help her. When Christine realises the 
significance of the accident she allows Ryan to approach her. The film pointedly focusses 
on his handling of her body. Ryan is at one point only inches away from Christine, but 
rather than the physical and racist violence of his earlier sexual assault, Crash stresses 
Christine’s invitation, and Ryan handles her in a way that reconfigures ‘touch’ between 
them. 
Tarja Laine reads this scene as one that represents an ethically productive form of 
‘touch’ in which Ryan is forced to engage with his earlier racist policing, and which 
initiates the possibility for an ‘unmediated’ and ethically reciprocal ‘touch’.35 Such 
reconfiguration is made possible through their contingent and unexpected encounter. ‘The 
accident,’ Laine suggests, ‘becomes a moment of reciprocity’, the condition of possibility 
for this idealised and reciprocal ‘touch’, because it circumvents both characters’ 
anticipatory measures, and opens ‘a possibility for reaching out to the other’.36 When 
Ryan wrenches Christine out of her car, he pulls her to him. The scene’s lurid 
cinematography, combining a centre shot of their embrace against a blue sky 
accompanied by the overpowering musical score, intimates a reconfigured kind of ‘touch’ 
as pined for by Graham. The film heroises Ryan, here, and emotively draws the two 
together. Their reckoning of one another hinges, crucially, on their accidental 
convergence. To recall the above theoretical contextualisation, contingency confers an 
ethical and political demand on those subject to it. If one doesn’t reduce the contingent 
event to the structure of a pre-given, presumably conservative necessity, contingency can 
provide ‘an opening through which a genuine relationship outside of clearly structured 
positions is possible.’37 Crash shows what this logic can be made to do in the context of 
‘touch’. The film collides Ryan and Christine together through accident in order to 
circumvent their ‘structured positions’, demanding their recognition of one another.  
Crash’s plotting of the accident in this way, however, reveals some of the 
shortcomings of this theorisation of the contingent encounter. Ryan’s and Christine’s 
reconnection through the accident is remarkably slight on race’s socially and 
institutionally specific formations, peddling individual heroism and flattening Christine’s 
warranted grievances in favour of an overly sentimental encounter.38 Indeed, the film’s 
focus on this kind of dramatic encounter is clearly at odds with other contingent events in 
its narrative that it does not choose to lavish with the same kind of attention, and which do 
not always produce such redemptive outcomes. A later scene in the film, in which middle 
class white housewife Jean falls down her staircase to be saved by her housekeeper, Maria 
(Yomi Perry), evidences this difference. 
Throughout the film Jean subjects Maria to a range of aggressions, but she has a 
sudden change of heart due to an accidental fall. Ninety minutes in, Jean walks towards 
her staircase while on the phone. We see a close up of her foot, and suddenly she slips. 
Unlike Christine’s accident, which the film situates in its cut, the camera languishes on 
the detail of Jean’s slipping foot at half speed. The camera then cuts to Jean, at the bottom 
of the stairs, and pans over her twisted leg before fading out. Crash returns to Jean’s 
storyline ten minutes later, with Jean sitting in a hospital bed. Maria then arrives. It turns 
out Maria discovered Jean after the accident and drove her to hospital. As Maria leans 
over Jean, Jean embraces her, and whispers ‘You’re the best friend I’ve got’. The film’s 
visual organisation of Jean’s slip lavishes attention on her accident and injury in a way 
that foregrounds the event as cause for her change of heart. The shot of their embrace then 
frames Jean’s face as central, obscuring the back of Maria’s head. Its meaning is simple: 
Jean ‘touches’ Maria, finally able to acknowledge her. Jean, who used to abuse Maria, is 
forced into a moment of ethical recognition, which makes Maria’s labour visible to her. 
But Maria, whose face is hidden, is nothing but a prop for Jean’s narrative redemption. 
Crash’s focus on Jean’s slip and the absence of Maria’s reaction to Jean’s change 
of heart implicates the film in an economy of attention that privileges particular scales of 
contingent event above others. The film has a blind spot in particular for what Elizabeth 
Povinelli terms ‘quasi-events’.39 Such events equally characterise the world’s constitutive 
subjection to contingency. They are widespread, a general condition of life, but they do 
not garner the attention reserved for the kinds of spectacular accident seen in Crash. The 
‘quasi-event’ is the unnoticed corollary of the catastrophic, a catalyst for endurance rather 
than a window into ethical encounter, occurring ‘within a socially differentiated world’ 
that distributes events differently according to race, class, and gender.40 Maria is also 
subject to contingency, but in the form of Jean’s arbitrary attacks, aggressive and 
unexpected addresses that Maria has to endure in multiple scenes. While not accidents 
necessarily, Maria’s subjection to an almost invisible accumulation of quasi-events is 
structurally metonymic of the film’s broader fascination with the onslaught of 
contingency. But like Maria’s face in the shot of Jean’s embrace, Crash renders these 
contingent events invisible at the expense of spectacular accidents, the latter of which 
seem only able to provide Crash with its means of foregrounding ‘the ethical dictates of 
empathic identification’ most clearly articulated by Graham’s formulation of ‘touch’.41 
Contingency may not be as flatly generative as Crash proposes therefore when subjection 
to it can equally produce unnoticed suffering. This is not contingency embraced 
‘wrongly’, as a critic of radical contingency might have it, then, but another manifestation 
of contingency, free of any kind of necessary interpretation, directed at someone who has 
no choice but to avow and endure it.  
The film’s focus on the spectacular accident at the expense of these invisible 
manifestations of contingency is symptomatic, I argue, of its broader attempt to pose 
contingency as politically productive and ethically demanding. To emphasise Jean’s 
recognition of Maria through accident, the film has to minimise Maria’s own endurance in 
the face of a different kind of contingency, which presents the unbalanced contextual 
effects of a constitutive condition that, supposedly, is generative in and of itself. This 
process is indicative of the film at large. Crash minimises context, a sense of the 
accident’s historical distribution, and the vectors of race and class in those moments 
precisely when the accident is most valued for its politically and ethically normative 
qualities. In this way, Crash inadvertently offers an aesthetic redress to theorisations of 
radical contingency. It represents in plot a stance toward the accident that shares a 
particular way of presenting contingent events also discernible in these discourses. But 
Crash also points to and problematises, on an aesthetic level, the argumentative 
conditions that ground the logic of this kind of politicised and ethicised contingency in 
critical theory. This logic, I suggest, suffers from an under-examination of its own 
presumed relationship between political subjectivity and what it purports as ontological 
ground. Crash’s exclusion of the different social and historical forms of contingency at 
the expense of a politically and ethically productive accident results, I argue, in a trope 
that is curiously contentless, a narrative event that, by the film’s conclusion, becomes 
flatly synonymous with time. 
 
Everywhere and all the time 
In this concluding section, I offer a theoretical alternative to the notion of politically 
radical and ethically demanding contingency. If contingency provides a description of the 
world in general, something to which everything is always already subjected, then the 
only way to acknowledge the different historical forms of contingency, as registered by 
Crash’s telling exclusions, would be to suggest that this constitutive subjection to 
accident is conditional for any and every political horizon or ethical demand. 
The issue over this double implication of contingency finds clearest discussion in 
the work of political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, writers who have not, 
as of yet, been put into conversation with critical theory’s recent turn to contingent events. 
For Laclau and Mouffe, the world is also constituted by an irreducible contingency, and 
they argue for ‘the ultimately contingent nature of all objectivity’.42 Forms of excess 
always exceed imagined totalities, universalism always implies antagonism, and events 
always deviate from proposed laws. ‘Contingency’ in Laclau and Mouffe concerns less 
the unexpected future than it does the structural relations between things and meaning’s 
essential historicity; it describes how everything from discursive formations to political 
decisions are never fixed, nor fully constituted or positively given from the beginning, but 
are rather the result of their outside relations. Like the linguistic sign whose meaning 
depends on its relation to other signs, nothing has positive political meaning in itself, but 
rather depends on historical context, and is discursively made. They repeatedly critique 
theories of political meaning that view political attachments as given from the outset, 
accusing these approaches of a metaphysics that views ‘history and society as intelligible 
totalities around conceptually explicable laws’.43 This critique and assertion of the 
absolute historicity of meaning yields their key ontological postulate: the world’s ‘radical 
contingency’.44  
Laclau and Mouffe address the politicisation of accidents in a crucial way. Both 
insist that radical contingency alone only provides a conditional description of the 
historicity of politics in general. Contingency is the ground on which any political 
decisions build, but the concept does not in itself legislate for a particular norm. Laclau 
often makes this point with reference to the meaninglessness of contingency absent from 
context, where ‘the assertion of the contingent nature of all objectivity’ would merely 
provide ‘nothing but indeterminacy and the impossibility of any coherent discourse’.45 
‘Pure’ contingency is ultimately meaningless. It cannot intrinsically precipitate a specific 
politicised horizon, then, nor offer ethical recognition of the other if embraced properly, 
because it is without content and is a general description of the world’s constitutive 
unfolding. Of course, a purely necessary world would forfeit freedom and the possibility 
of future difference. But radical contingency in Laclau and Mouffe’s terms is a 
description of what one is always already subject to: a ground for any and every political 
decision that can produce both ethical and non-ethical relations. It is, as Laclau puts it 
elsewhere, ‘constitutive of all experience’.46 
Laclau and Mouffe’s work pinpoints the problem of reaching for a description of 
the world to offer a specific kind of political and ethical content if recognised in the right 
way. Contingency cannot alone prescribe a rule for how to ethically relate to another, nor 
does it guarantee a particular kind of political future if one was to embrace this state of 
affairs.47 Rather, contingency’s recognition provides a descriptive understanding of time’s 
constitutive relationship to the unforeseeable future. Laclau and Mouffe’s account of the 
relationship between contingency and specific political and ethical decisions therefore 
helps to explain Crash’s minimisation of the accident’s historically uneven distribution 
and its exclusion of racial and class formations in the service of a simplistic account of 
ethically charged, politically productive encounters. These are the direct result of its effort 
to transform a concept that is ground for any and every decision into an implicitly 
political and ethical opening, which can only cohere through a focus on the accident’s 
‘positive’ manifestations at the expense of its ‘negative’ ones. In other words, by inuring 
itself to structural critique.  
The film’s socially reductive logic loops back into theories of the politically and 
ethically productive accident, to show, through popular aesthetic form, the theoretical 
inadequacy of staking a specific politics to contingency. This results in a curiously 
meaningless portrayal of accidents by the end of the film. Its final scene, following on 
from a lengthy montage of various characters, begins with Anthony, who releases victims 
of a smuggling operation from a stolen vehicle before driving off. The camera tracks his 
van in a panning shot to the left. Two cars then emerge in the left foreground of the frame, 
interrupting the pan. The shot readjusts, following these vehicles as they move to the 
right. The car in front position of this right pan brakes suddenly and the second car behind 
crashes into it. The collision is almost centre frame in this arrested shot. The two drivers 
get out and argue with each other. After a short while, we cut to an aerial shot of their 
argument. The aerial shot rises above them and gradually expands its field of vision, 
incorporating the crossroad and other, interconnected roads. After some time, the camera 
stops, and angles 90 degrees up to the L.A. highway, offering an expansive vision of 
hundreds of cars on a busy spaghetti junction, before closing to the credits. 
The scene’s expansive cinematography re-distributes an isolated accident onto the 
entire city at large, re-populating this final crash across the city. The slow and steady 
presence of passing traffic in the bottom half of the shot smothers the abrupt shock of the 
earlier accident. But the pointed juxtaposition of these two images, the sudden accident 
and the moving traffic, also asks the audience to view the singular accident as immanent 
in these other vehicles. The cinematography transposes the accident onto this busy 
highway, and in doing so temporalises it. In other words, the closing scene transforms the 
final accident into a synecdoche for a more systemic contingency, with the promise of 
accident elsewhere in the city. The accident becomes a principle of unexpected 
divergence immanent in passing time. Despite the film’s previous effort to politicise 
accidents, and to use contingency to circumvent characters’ anticipations of one another, 
there is something remarkably empty about the film’s final evocation of accident. It is as 
if, ultimately, Crash stretches the trope to include any and every contingent event and in 
doing so evacuates it of meaning. 
The film’s eventual reduction of the accident to a kind of ubiquitous 
meaninglessness results from its pining for a specific political and ethical meaning from a 
trope that is representative of the world’s constitutive subjection to contingency. In this 
way, the film’s stance towards accidents reflects a related attitude to politicised 
contingency in discourses of radical contingency. In both cases, however, the travelling of 
contingency from ontological ground to an opening for political decision and ethical 
relation collapses in on itself, and looks instead like a vague embrace of empty 
temporality. Treating the contingent event’s ontological immanence as sufficient ground 
for specific political and ethical decision inadvertently excises accident and contingency 
from their social and historical contexts. This produces a narrative manoeuvre found 
throughout Crash, in which the film treats the accident as politically and ethically 
productive in those moments when it also absents itself from structural critique. As a 
result, Crash’s urge for an embrace of accidents in this final scene comes to look less like 
something that implies a specific ethics or politics, and much more like an empty 
temporality to which character and viewer alike are passive subjects. Such openness to 
contingency may precede political and ethical decision, but the film’s expansion of the 
accident to the point of being indissociable from time suggests that it cannot alone and in 
itself prescribe a particular ethics of interaction nor guarantee, when embraced, a specific 
political horizon.  
If everything is contingent, then contingency cannot be in itself essentially 
emancipatory, nor a shortcut for ethical relation. Contingency does not automatically 
breach into and broach other, better futures. It is more appropriate to see contingency as 
the ground from which political decisions and ethical (and non-ethical) engagements 
proceed, rather than something that one seeks out, like Graham, hoping for the ultimately 
productive to emerge from the unforeseeable. Not, that is, when accidents happen 
everywhere and all the time. 
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